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THE CONSTITUENT STRUGGLES OF SELF-AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVES 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this article I argue that the people can constitute itself democratically, if only partially, through the 
retrospective granting or denying of authority to claims to speak in its name. However, for this 
process to be democratic enhancing, it must occur under systemic conditions that empower the public 
to participate in claim-making and foster recognition of the partiality and incompleteness of any such 
claims to the people. To this purpose, I bring together two important streams within democratic 
theory: the discussion of the paradox of democratic self-constitution and the current literature on 
representation. Within the latter, I engage in particular with the figure of the self-authorised 
representative, i.e., the representative who makes claims of representation beyond the electoral 
framework, and with the constructivist turn in theories of representation, in the terms of which the 
people is best understood as construct or after-effect of claims to speak in its name. By self-
constitution, I do not refer, however, to the ÒoriginsÓ of a people, but rather to an ongoing process of 
opening the people to question, of making it the object of contestation. With this move, I shift the 
terms of self-determination from self-constitution in the historical sense, as foundational, to re-
constitution, or the people as iterative. I maintain that self-authorised representatives, speaking for 
parts of the people that are unaccounted for within formal representative institutions, and offering 
themselves as Òpassageways between themselves and something else to come,Ó a people yet to be, are 
the chief, albeit by no means the only, political actors engaged in this re-constitution. I ground my 
argument in an analysis of RousseauÕs legislator and the representative politics of Occupy Wall Street. 
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Introduction 
 
Democratic theory typically considers the people to be the source of political legitimacy. To speak in 
the name of the people is, therefore, to speak draped in the mantle of authority. There is widespread 
disagreement, however, about what kind of entity the people is. If this notion is to be taken as an 
empirical reality or an organised corporate body, one runs into a series of paradoxes, since it would 
seem that the people would both have to constitute itself, and to have been constituted, before it could 
act as the agent of its own constitution. The so-called Òparadox of democratic self-constitutionÓ, 
whereby the democratic agent being posited is taken to be both the cause and effect of action, is the 
most fundamental of all democratic paradoxes and is thought to imply that the people itself cannot be 
democratically constituted. 
 
In this article I argue that the people can constitute itself democratically, if only partially, through the 
retrospective granting or denying of authority to claims to speak in its name. However, for this 
process to be democratic enhancing, it must occur under systemic conditions that empower the public 
to participate in claim-making and foster recognition of the partiality and incompleteness of any such 
claims to the people. To this purpose, I bring together two important streams within democratic 
theory: the discussion of the paradox of democratic self-constitution and the current literature on 
representation. Within the latter, I engage in particular with the figure of the self-authorised 
representative,1 i.e., the representative who makes claims of representation beyond the electoral 
framework, and with the constructivist turn in theories of representation, in the terms of which the 
people is best understood as construct or after-effect of claims to speak in its name.2  
 
By self-constitution, I do not refer, however, to the ÒoriginsÓ of a people, but rather to an ongoing 
process of opening the people to question, of making it the object of contestation. With this move, I 
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shift the terms of self-determination from self-constitution in the historical sense, as foundational, to 
re-constitution, or the people as iterative. I maintain that self-authorised representatives, speaking for 
parts of the people that are unaccounted for within formal representative institutions, and offering 
themselves as Òpassageways between themselves and something else to come,Ó3 a people yet to be, 
are the chief, albeit by no means the only, political actors engaged in this re-constitution. This is 
because in their push for inclusion and responsiveness,4 or, more radically, in their questioning of the 
a priori conditions that determine both, they often come to place the dispute over the people at a 
constituent level: how to define the people in the first place.  
 
Their constituent capacity cannot be separated from the order in which it occurs. Contemporary 
democracies are framed by a contest of representative claims to the people based on a number of 
different sources of legitimacy. Electorally authorised representatives (legislators, executives, 
sometimes also judges) play a key role in re-constituting the people in their deliberations and rhetoric 
in the parliament and media as well as in the vast array of decisions they take in the peopleÕs name. 
Given their internal division, representative institutions may themselves encourage discussion about 
what the peopleÕs will is, or, sometimes more fundamentally, about the constitution of the people 
itself.5 But, most commonly, they set forth and act upon positive representations of both the people 
and its will premised on a given understanding of who the people are. These representations may, 
however, leave many (and their interests) unaccounted for. This is what self-authorised representation 
has to struggle against to refound (reform or revolutionise) democracy.   
 
Democratic Foundings 
 
Self-authorised representatives are often treated as a relatively new type of political actor arising in 
response to the progressive de-territorialisation of politics at both national and global level.6 However, 
debates about who rightfully speaks for the people in the wake of the multiplication of unauthorized 
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claims to popular authority reach far back in history, notably in the history of democracies. This is 
because in democracies the Òlocus of power becomes an empty placeÓ7 open to contest. And as the 
people becomes its own authority, ultimate authority is vested in an entity that is both abstract and 
distant, which can never speak in its own name but only make itself known, if at all, through 
representatives. In this, popular sovereignty resembles divine-right monarchy, and lends itself to 
similar the dangers of usurpation.8 Worries about usurpation are integral to the dilemmas of 
democratic foundings, which, whether in theory or practice, necessarily involve self-authorised 
representation validated by appeals to an external source of legitimacy: a prefigured people, a people 
yet to be. It is therefore no coincidence that the figure of the legislator shares close affinities with that 
of the self-authorised representative as we have come to conceive it.  
 
There is not better place from which to explore these affinities than the classical locus of the paradox 
of democratic self-constitution, RousseauÕs Social Contract. In that work, Rousseau maintains that to 
deem the blind multitude who authored its own enslavement capable of thinking and acting 
themselves into an autonomous, self-legislating people, by setting the principles of politics and 
institutions that unite them in generality, is to mistake the effect for the cause, and therefore to 
wrongly take the kind of man that only law and institutions can produce for their maker.9 The 
legislator is RousseauÕs way out of this conundrum. He characterises the legislator as an outsider, 
whose main task is to make a people out of the inchoate multitude. This, he admits, is a momentous 
task, which the legislator must carry out without holding any of the political authority that would 
normally enable him to perform it. As an extra-legal and extra-institutional figure, he has neither 
magistracy nor sovereignty, and therefore does not, and cannot, have any authority over the men on 
whom he bestows laws.  
 
Rousseau is at pains to stress the oddity of the situation the legislator finds himself in: he is entrusted 
with Òan undertaking beyond human force, and to execute it an authority that is nil.Ó10 This is a 
situation that is not reversed with the establishment of the basic law, since the legislatorÕs function can 
have no set in it: he must remain an outsider to constitutional legitimacy. Hence, no laws can ever be 
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passed on the legislatorÕs authority alone: only the peopleÕs consent can retroactively confer authority 
upon the system of laws he proposes to them qua multitude.11 
 
The legislator acts therefore in the manner of a self-authorised representative, who takes the public 
stage without prior authorisation to exercise a doubly representative task: he represents the general 
will by standing in for it, and he represents a people-to-be to the multitude by devising a system of 
laws that forms a people out it. He acts as a passageway between the people as is and a normative 
people yet to be that enables the multitude to see into the future, and imagine themselves invested in 
the lives of one another, and in the enactment of a new political subject Ð a sovereign democratic 
community. 
 
Given RousseauÕs diatribes against representation, the characterisation of the legislator as a self-
authorised representative may warrant further investigation.12 The representatives Rousseau objects to 
are those whom the people Òpromises simply to obey:Ó13 that is, representatives that, once authorised, 
turn into masters, ruling over the people and usurping the peopleÕs sovereignty in representing it. The 
legislator is unlike them in that he does not hold representative status as a matter of fact, nor does he 
have any of the forms of political authority that would give his proclamations automatic legal status.  
 
While the multitude depends on the legislator to make them pliable into a people, the legislator 
depends on their favourable opinion to get his political project off the ground.14 It is their acceptance 
that gives his laws an authoritative effect, and once this happens he will have no power, and 
eventually vanish. But not without the spectral remainder of his exemplary role and the laws that 
continue to both constrain and enable the peopleÕs autonomy. The multitudeÕs ownership of the laws 
presupposes their transformation through the legislatorÕs programme of political education, where 
exemplarity is key. This must change them so radically that it becomes possible for them to reclaim 
their democratic autonomy retroactively, by making theirs the words that mile uttered at the end of 
his own private education: ÒI have decided to be what you have made of me.Ó15 
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The legislator is retroactively authorized by the people, and this temporal dissonance signals that 
democratic self-constitution is an ongoing, iterative process. Unlike electoral authorisation, the 
authorisation of an order of established laws and institutions is not a once-and-for all event, inviting 
passive compliance. This is for two main reasons. First, the sovereign body cannot bind itself with the 
basic law, since it is of the very nature of the sovereign will that it cannot commit itself for the future. 
Will exists only in willing, and genuine law being but the declaration of the general will it cannot be 
simply established; it must be continuously constituted by individuals rediscovering and willing it 
together: Òwhen the law speaks in the name of the people, it is the name of the people at present and 
not that of former times.Ó16 Second, just as the legislator will be recognised as such only after the fact 
of their authorisation, so will the question of whether his proposals suit a particular people, of whether 
he is a political genius or a charlatan, be possible to settle only after their enactment, which, if 
successful, will already be transforming that empirical people into the normative people envisaged by 
the system of laws.  
 
But for this to happen, the people must first be persuaded to adopt the legislatorÕs proclamations, 
which, despite not being laws as such, must appear in their eyes as they ought to be. The usual 
instruments of politics will not do. Neither coercion, nor argument, not even appeal to self-interest, 
are acceptable or effective in his quest for popular backing. The legislator must resort instead to Òan 
authority of a different order, which might be able to rally without violence and to persuade without 
convincing.Ó17 Religion and charisma typify these other forms of authority that Rousseau believes to 
be necessary to compensate for the legislatorÕs lack of legal, or indeed popular, authority. He must act 
by divine authority in order to have his laws granted popular authority. But this attempt to compensate 
for democracyÕs lack of natural foundations produces only partial closure: Òit fixes the peopleÕs 
identity as sovereign but does not fix the content of that identityÓ, which remains open to Òquestioning 
and transformation.Ó18 Perfect closure would render unnecessary the constant willing of the general 
will; it would lead to apathy and stagnation, to the people ceasing to be.  
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It is one thing to choose the right system of laws for a given people, it is quite another to persuade that 
people to recognize their own voice as that through which the laws speak. To invoke the reasoning of 
the science of legislation to this purpose, Rousseau argues, is self-defeating. It is incomprehensible to 
most people and lacks motivational force. Hence the appeal to the gods (and the menace they pose) 
must be complemented with symbolism and the melodic language of persuasive rhetoric, expressing 
feeling rather than thought, showing rather than arguing, to move the people into accepting its legal 
foundation. Music Òpaints everything, even those objects which are not visibleÉ she seems to put the 
eye to the ear.Ó19 This power of depicting what is abstract and distant, what is not yet visible, is 
essential to the legislatorÕs task, given that Òthe peopleÓ he represents to them through the system of 
laws does not precede the act of representation, but is rather prefigured by it. RousseauÕs discussion of 
what is involved in the staging of unauthorized democratic claims making raises, therefore, two 
important points: first, the construction of democratic autonomy may be more or less, but never fully, 
autonomous, and, second, it may have to involve non-deliberative, non-discursive, even forceful 
means, whose legitimacy can be assessed retrospectively only.20 
 
The analysis of RousseauÕs legislator, an unauthorized representative staging an original claim to the 
people, brought out the fundamentals of a theory of democratic foundings Ð namely, the interplay, 
indeed, the constitutive interdependence, between autonomy and heteronomy, openness and closure, 
positive representation and ongoing dispute over the people Ð and the risks of usurpation such 
foundings inevitably contain. RousseauÕs emphasis on participation in the continuous constitution of 
the general will, or the citizenry taking on themselves the role of the vanishing legislator, as the 
condition of their self-determination, the ultimate unrepresentability of the people is asserted: the 
people remains that about which we dispute, Òa site of questioning and transformation.Ó21 The 
legitimacy of the people never being fully established, democracy remains Òalways embedded in the 
problem of origins and survival: how to (re)shape the multitude into a people, daily.Ó22 The problem is 
always there, but it has moments of especially acute articulation. It is to one such moment that I turn 
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next, by analysing the representative dynamics of a self-authorized political actor who took over the 
speaking and acting position of Òthe peopleÓ to provoke a democratic awakening: Occupy Wall Street. 
 
The characterisation of Occupy as a self-authorised representative is far from controversial. Hence, I 
start by exploring the Rousseauean logic of OcuppyÕs resistance to representation. This resistance is 
then pitted against the movementÕs ambition to speak for others, and the possible grounds for the 
legitimacy of that claim are examined. From this I move to a discussion of the particular nature of 
OccupyÕs politics of representation, paying especial attention to the challenges the movement faced in 
the unauthorized staging of its claim to the 99 per cent. I finish with an assessment of the success of 
the movementÕs attempt to empower people to exercise constituent power, and enact a new political 
subject.  
 
Beyond Representation?  
 
The rise of the informal politics of social movements is often taken as proof that politics is extending 
beyond the realm of representation.23 On this account, representation is identified as the distinctive 
business of states, whose apparatuses are controlled by elites lifted to power by rival political parties 
competing amongst themselves in elections and mediating conflicts between recognized groups in 
society. This narrow understanding of representation also lay behind OccupyÕs self-depiction as a 
post-representational movement. For the movement, representation stood for Òpolitics as usual,Ó and, 
more generally, for the associated evils of hierarchy, distance, and domination. Hence the movementÕs 
rejection of representation at both the individual level and the movement level: neither could the 
movement represent its members nor could it allow for its own representation. 
 
But if the failure of current elites to represent the people was the immediate catalyst of Occupy, their 
resistance to the principle of representation as such stemmed from a Rousseauean belief that the will 
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cannot be represented. Since a represented will is not the self-same will, Rousseau warned, 
representation harbours the danger of alienation of oneself to another, loss of freedom and 
enslavement. Taken at face value, the prohibition of having another willing for oneself might be taken 
in an unRousseauean direction, and assumed to undercut any obligation to obey the will of the 
majority if distinct from oneÕs own, since that would be to let another will for oneself. This belief 
reflected itself in OccupyÕs favoured procedures, which were especially designed to prevent anyone 
from being spoken for. Its time-consuming consensus-based practices aimed at group decisions that 
could literally be said to be the decisions of each and every one of its members, just as the admission 
of a block, or last resort veto, meant to ensure that no one would find himself involved in a group 
decision he dissented from.  
 
The egalitarian division of power in a democracy implies that no individual has the ability to 
determine the groupÕs decision. For Occupiers, its primary meaning, however, was that no one should 
find himself represented against his will. Occupy would rather leave its members to decide on a case-
by-case basis whether they wished to be represented by the groupÕs collective decision. In cases of 
serious objection, or Òhard blockÓ, the assumption was not so much that the individual could express 
disagreement by exiting the group, but that the group could not continue representing in the face of 
the robust objection of one or a minority of its members. 
 
Democratic representation entails the capacity to object on the part of the represented. Occupy took 
this rule to an almost paradoxical effect: while the voice of each protester as ritualistically amplified 
through the ÒpeopleÕs micÓ acquired the aura of a collectively endorsed proposition, the majority 
could have its voice trumped by one or the few. This created an uneasy tension between, on the one 
hand, OccupyÕs self-depiction as a moral and affective self-governing community resisting the 
hegemonic pull of liberal individualism, and, on the other hand, the atomising effects of its 
understanding of group representation in terms of the representation of the individuals comprising it.  
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At the group level representation was also resisted. To permit the movement to be represented and 
attributed a will of its own, set on particular interests, demands, or concerns, was, in the understanding 
of most Occupiers, to allow leadership, hierarchy, and domination to enter through the back door. 
Whilst the movement represented itself publicly by establishing a name, ÒOccupy,Ó around which it 
organised its collective power, and even though it crafted something of a personality by narrating a 
story about itself, Occupy resisted its binding to any well defined collective personality, since the very 
nature of its Rousseauean sovereignty was to be wholly free at every moment in time, just as it 
resisted representation by a figurehead leadership for the potential for usurpation that it always 
carries. This resulted in the movement acting less as a single issue social movement, representing its 
unity to itself and others, than as a blank screen upon which everyone could project his own 
grievances, and from which anyone could speak variously for the movement, in his or her own name.   
 
Despite OccupyÕs unRousseauean rejection of a group will that was not the same time the will of all, 
there was an almost Rousseauean quality about its objection to the groupÕs representation: the 
movementÕs will could not commit itself to the future, because a will that does so loses its freedom. 
Hence the movementÕs resistance to making demands was not only a refusal to recognise the system 
from which such demands would have to be made. It was also a refusal to have any potentially 
singular unity represented that might set a binding precedence in terms of the groupÕs identity.  
 
For many Occupiers, the movement gathered its strength precisely from remaining without content, 
and therefore available to new social demands. As one of the activists put it, just as the power of a 
work of art rests upon leaving its meaning undetermined, so OccupyÕs rise to prominence was 
dependant on its remaining determinedly unprogrammatic, resisting both resolution and state power.24 
Their continuous reassembling for purposes of consultation and deliberation spoke of the movementÕs 
uneasy relationship with power as a positive ground for action.25 It also revealed its attraction to a 
system of self-rule avoiding the exercise of power by presenting itself as pure procedure, responding 
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at every instant to the current, and changing, state of its membersÕ wills as checked through repeated 
non-binding straw polls or Òtemperature checksÓ.  
 
There was an obvious danger in this: that in refusing to coalesce in a lasting positive representation of 
itself Occupy would end up condemned to the shelf-life of the occupation. But this danger came with 
a possible added benefit: that by stopping at opening the crack through which it became possible to 
peer into a different future, Occupy kept the political realm it had just reopened safe from immediate 
recapture by its own present will as to what that future might be.  
 
OccupyÕs refusal to offer a blueprint for the future cohabited, however, with its members conviction 
that they were already living it and presenting it for others to see. Opposition to representation was the 
flipside of the movementÕs endorsement of horizontalism or participatory forms of direct democracy. 
For Rousseau as for most Occupiers, representative democracies are systems of government, whose 
very structure determines that the vast majority of citizens are blocked from the activity of ruling, and 
consigned to play the role of spectators sitting at one remove from political life. By contrast, 
Occupiers aimed at a future democratic community prefigured in the lived experience of the 
occupation. This, they believed, anticipated an alternative form of being-together, eschewing all 
representational forms of power, eliminating all distance opened up by the indirectness of current 
politics. If they had a message, the occupation was it: it showed those who were now citizen-
spectators ways of re-entering the circle of action, ways of reconfiguring the space of appearance so 
that they could reclaim the power to speak and act from which they had been cut off.  
 
Representative Legitimacy  
 
But it is one thing to affirm the post-representative nature of oneÕs politics, what oneÕs politics reveals 
is quite another, and OccupyÕs politics crossed over the facile opposition between representation and 
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participation on which it supposedly rested. It is not only that a rival claim to representation was 
implicit in the activistsÕ understanding of their activity as a quest to challenge exclusion from the 
party system and the decision-making of governments they depicted as hostage to the interests of a 
plutocracy. If Occupiers were speaking solely on their own behalf, there would be no reason to expect 
their objections to hold for anyone other than themselves. But if non-members were to be in any way 
involved in their claims, then OccupiersÕ action must have remained inscribed in a representative 
paradigm.  
 
This inescapability of representation should not surprise us. The opposition between representation 
and participation is a long-established credo of democratic theory, and an internalized belief of most 
of its practitioners. However, their relationship is far more complex: representation and participation 
are bound up with one another; they are indeed mutually constitutive. Representational relationships 
are the very condition of the democratic mobilisation and participation of what is a naturally 
inarticulate public, incapable of speaking and acting of their own accord: the democratic public. As 
Rousseau showed us, in the absence of a relationship with a representative, proposing a language for 
the expression of meaningful commonalities, the democratic public would remain forever silent.26 
And Occupy meant precisely to reclaim that voice to the public. 
 
The movementÕs repudiation of representation sits therefore uncomfortably with this goal, as 
encapsulated in the slogan that came to stand for the movement, the reverberating ÒWe Are the 99 Per 
CentÓ. Although the slogan is both polarizing and anti-representation in its discourse (raising the 
question of whether in Occupy we have an emancipatory agent or a populist impostor, or perhaps 
something of both), it seems beyond dispute that it is structured as a representative claim.27 And if the 
slogan implies representation, we may wish to ask on what grounds Occupy made its claim to 
representative legitimacy.  
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At first glance, the slogan may suggest that we are before a claim to representation as identification. 
In other words, that Occupy claimed to represent the 99 per cent of Americans on account of a basic 
identity both groups shared Ð that is, of what they perceived themselves, or were perceived by others, 
to be. But if this were their claim, it would be far from self-evident.  
 
An immediate difficulty is that though Occupy drew on a vast array of protestors, they were at best a 
tiny part of the 99 per cent in whose name they took to the streets. Furthermore, the protestersÕ 
primarily urban, young, and white demographics lent little plausibility to any claim to representing the 
general population descriptively. Occupy neither reflected the populationÕs diversity of social 
characteristics nor its plurality of political views, despite the movementÕs own internal division 
between different political tendencies and different degrees of radicalism. Minority groups (Afro-
Americans, Latinos, etc.), especially affected by the crisis and the wronged equality Occupy exposed, 
were only marginally involved. And the movementÕs core being anarchist, it could hardly be said to 
ideologically align with the rest of the population.  
 
This points towards yet another divide that might undercut the movementÕs claim to representative 
legitimacy if taken as a claim to representation as identification. I refer to the divide between activists 
and non-activists, i.e., people with varying degrees of involvement in, and sympathy for, the Occupy 
movement, but whose concerns were far more passive. One might wish to argue that sympathizers and 
mere bystanders identified with the activists in the sense that, given the opportunity, they would have 
behaved similarly, and taken part in protest. But this would be stretching a point. Some people engage 
in direct forms of political expression regularly, while others do not, and never will. ActivistsÕ came 
from a far more radical ideological background than the ordinary citizen, who, albeit possibly 
sympathetic towards the movementÕs denunciation of growing inequality, could be easily put off by 
its direct action tactics and revolutionary goals. It is, therefore, safe to assume that both groups, Ð 
activists and sympathizers, Ð were far from alike or like-minded. Instead, they diverged considerably, 
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and this was not only in their self- and other perceptions, but also in their commitment to protest and 
in their expectations of what protest might achieve. 
 
This is a gap that did not escape the movementÕs critics, who trusted it to limit the movementÕs 
broader appeal. It was also a gap that the experience of the occupation had the potential to widen. For 
many of the activists, the movement was chiefly about what was happening on the ground: the life 
stories that were being shared, the bonds that were being formed, the day-to-day life in the 
encampment, with its ongoing experiments in direct democracy. Theirs, they believed, was a 
community like no other, and one prefiguring a future, which, were the movement to be successful, 
would emerge by way of contagion. But however transformative this experience might have been, it 
could not be shared by sympathetic bystanders, who followed the movement at some remove, from 
the comfort of their homes. As time elapsed, these two groupsÕ contrasting experiences of what the 
movement meant or was about were likely to drive them further apart, creating a growing divide 
between the occupation and any political claims transcending it, with those on the ground ever more 
militant and seeing the occupation as the focus of the movement, and those at home wanting no part in 
it, but happy for the movement to create pressure for policies that made the economy work better for 
everyone.28 
 
But even if one acknowledges that the movement was a very partial sample of the wider public, this 
would say little about OccupyÕs source of legitimacy. For descriptive representation was arguably 
never the point. The movementÕs representative legitimacy might be seen as better described as a kind 
of Òsurrogacy of excluded interests,Ó29 Òbased on the fact that an important perspective is not being 
heard or voiced, especially due to structural limitations arising from the institutional configuration of 
conventional representative governmentÓ30 and the self-reinforcing patterns of income and wealth 
distribution within capitalism itself.31  
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In support of this view, it can plausibility be argued that the crash of 2008 increased the chances that 
between Occupiers and ordinary Americans there would be some grounds for identification after all. 
The recession transformed the experience of unemployment and private debt into an increasingly 
common denominator and a potential politically significant commonality. This experience pooled 
closer together the predicaments of groups that would otherwise have remained fundamentally 
unconnected, possibly even critically at odds Ð unemployed youth, the working middle class, laid-off 
factory workers, the public workers, and the working poor. They could now far more plausibly be 
given presence in the actions of one another. This was a presence not necessarily grounded on a 
shared experience of genuine deprivation, but rather on something thinner, but insinuating: the fear of 
it. Yet to assume unity in such a wide variety of people; to assume that a representation of the identity 
of their interests could ever be made politically credible; to suppose that the 99 per cent could have 
more in common than perhaps a sense of being disserviced by the system, and even that, to very 
different degrees, would be self-defeatingly naf.  
 
To its credit, Occupy avoided making such positive claims. Hence to characterise the movement as a 
surrogate of excluded interests might be somewhat misleading. It suggests that the movement staged a 
conflict of interests, and aimed primarily at interest representation, or the division of lots between 
recognized groups in society. Arguably, however, the movement wanted to stage a more fundamental 
disruption of the very frame within which we came to see our wronged equality as a given. Instead of 
putting the emphasis on interests, the stress should go to the expressive representation of exclusion 
itself. For the primary issue Occupy raised was the paradox between the immensity of the number (the 
figure of 99 per cent) and what it counted for in the terms of the constituted political order.      
 
The Politics of Representation 
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But the pervasiveness of exclusion is one thing; to come to see it as shared and to question what it 
might mean is quite another. OccupyÕs representative claim sought to effect the transition from one to 
the other. It provided the incentive for different groups in society to think themselves into the 99 per 
cent of Americans whose common experience the movement depicted as that of being miscounted by 
the system. In so doing, the claim played with the double reference of the people as the plebs, or the 
class that the system excludes, and to the people as the constitutive political subject on which the 
legitimacy of the democratic system depends.32 In standing in for the 99 per cent, Occupiers 
encouraged the multitude to consider themselves as plebs, while, at the same time, asserting the plebs 
as sovereign.  
 
This was a fundamental constituent power, or capacity to found again, which the movement sought to 
effect by means of a slogan that was an instance of performative speech. This much is shown by the 
contrast between the 99 per cent as inert statistical data and the 99 per cent as an illocutionary act 
aiming to enact the collective power of the people.  
 
Well before Occupy New York took hold of Zuccotti Park in 2011, a wealth of data, divulged through 
multiple media, from academic papers to blogs, showed that in recent years the income of the vast 
majority of American households had stagnated or fallen, while the income of those at the very top 
had grown exponentially.33 In 2009, Nobel Prize winner, Joseph Stiglitz, sought to give political bite 
to these research findings in a magazine article suggestively entitled ÒOf the 1 per cent, by the 1 per 
cent, for the 1 per centÓ. As the title indicates, the article spoke of the seizure of the system by a self-
serving elite few, to whom it gave a dire warning: AmericaÕs wealth gap might soon be exceeding any 
reasonable levels of tolerability and end up bringing the wave of mass protest witnessed abroad closer 
to home. The prophecy proved self-fulfilling, but its publication in a lifestyle magazine, Vanity Fair, 
whose readership is the elite and those aspiring to it, amounted to a performative contradiction of 
sorts.34 
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It was left to Occupy to redirect the message from the 1-per cent to the 99-per cent. To that purpose, 
they selected a different medium, an occupation. It symbolically put the people in charge of the public 
space, and re-appropriated politics as belonging in the public sphere. This was not just any public 
space, however: it was Wall Street, and spatially embodied the contradiction of the existence of two 
worlds in single world Ð the world in which the 99 per cent were of some account, and the world in 
which they were not.35 OccupyÕs rallying cry, ÒWere Are the 99 Per CentÓ, sought to make 
community by placing in common a wrong. It personalised structural injustice and interpreted the 
resulting relation of forces as a new instance of class struggle between the very richest and the rest. 
This was no longer an attempt to control the super-rich by appealing to their enlightened self-interest, 
as StiglitzÕs had been. It was rather an attempted act of performative self-foundation, devolving the 
people its constituent capacity to refashion the world or the a priori conditions circumscribing the 
limits of political life. It sought to call Americans (and other 99 per centers watching them) into self-
conscious collective agency. Their image as reflected back onto themselves was that of Òa peopleÓ 
newly empowered to name and confront a wrong affecting virtually everyone. 
 
To make sense of this ÒpeopleÓ it may be helpful to draw on Jacques RancireÕs conception of the 
people as a name for processes of subjectivisation by which the excluded stage a distinctively political 
dispute about the configuration of the social and political order that leaves them uncounted, that 
wrongs their equality. Politics, Rancire stresses, Òis a matter of subjects or, rather, modes of 
subjectification.Ó36 By subjectification, he means the production of a capacity for enunciation not 
previously identifiable in a given field of experience, and whose identification requires the 
reconfiguration of that field. The name of the subject of enunciation is Òthe peopleÓ, which is also the 
name for the part of the community that has no real part in it because it has been uncounted, and 
therefore Òonly exists in the very declaration in which they are counted as those of no account,Ó37 
OccupyÕs 99 per cent. Politics is the activity of the uncounted in denouncing and seeking to address 
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their wronged equality by reconfiguring a space of appearance that denied them either visibility or 
voice. It works by positing a subject in advance of political action, which is not given in advance of 
those actions, but rather results from the claims to community, the claims to speak for someone and to 
someone, in which those actions consist. In opening the people to dispute, politics is unusual: it 
happens sparsely, even though its staging can range from the grand (e.g., a demonstration or, pace 
Rancire, in a Supreme Court ruling) to the minute (e.g., a Black woman refusing to give up her seat 
in a segregated bus). But when it does happen, it is poetic: it has a constituent power, Òa peopleÓ 
happens, even if nothing seems to change in its aftermath.  
 
Performing the Representative Claim 
 
Since however any such claim to community hinges on an improbable staging of disruptive equality, 
which has to break through the existing order of inequality, its performative dimension, its 
dramatization, is of paramount importance for its capacity to engage its audience and produce effect. 
As Rancire puts it, politics is a matter of Òperforming or playing, in the theatrical sense of the word, 
the gap between a place where the demos exists and a place where it does not.Ó38 Self-authorised 
representatives Ð that is, he/they who claim to represent others, to play the part of those who have 
been denied it, without having received authority from, or being formally accountable to them Ð are 
the main political actors of such ÒplayingÓ. But their impromptu improvisations of democratic voice, 
as pitted against representative institutions, have to contend with established forms of authority and 
authorisation. In a democratic context, electoral authorisation is the common means for exercising 
political authority.39 It lies behind the constitution of subordinate political authorities acting in a 
representative capacity, which derive their right to act in ways that are binding for all from the prior 
authority of the democratic people, or of the democratic procedure. By contrast, self-authorised 
representative claims, which set themselves up to represent the peopleÕs voice, are made beyond the 
democratic electoral context and yearn for an authority they aspire to, and draw from in advance, but 
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do not yet possess. In other words, they have a fictional and staged quality in that they are acted as if 
they were in possession of democratic authority, but, in truth, their validation can only be gained 
retrospectively. This is because it is dependent on their ability to resonate with their audience and to 
be accepted, or at least not rejected, by the constituency in whose name they are made.  
 
As is typical of self-authorised representation, OccupyÕs slogan appeared in an unauthorised context 
and drew on the authority of an agent who did not exist Ð a people yet to be, the very subject they 
were positing (and thereby constituting) in advance of political action. Occupiers performed their 
claim to the multitude from improvised stages, the street, the plaza or the park, not from any formal 
representative institution, so they spoke from loci that were not underwritten by authority, understood 
as a specific source of power, vested in persons by virtue of their offices. Instead, they sought to 
ground their speaking position by appealing to ÒexternalÓ sources of legitimacy, an excluded 99 per 
cent and a prefigured democratic future, whose images (e.g., their assemblies) they needed to create 
and disseminate.  
 
We must pause to think about the meaning of externality or outsidedness in this context. For it is far 
from evident. Dissensus is the power exercised by those who have no qualification for exercising 
power. However, the members of Occupy were themselves largely American citizens who are 
sovereign Ð not in the Rousseauean sense, of sovereignty as law-making, but nevertheless as a 
quantitative multiplicity of individuals who qualify for exercising power through vote, and whose 
votes, if cast, will be counted. But this very quantitative multiplicity was the reason behind their 
externality to the political order: the 99 per cent are too numerous to be organised, too atomised and 
divided, to make a difference politically. Their power depends on an ability to act in concert, to 
persuade or even coerce others. And this ability depends on political forms of subjectification drawing 
on particular lines of fracture, which only representative claims making can produce.  
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These claim depend on apt staging. In formal representative institutions (such as a parliament or a 
senate), representatives enjoy a presumption of representative status independent of their 
performance; things work otherwise in the street. This much was demonstrated by the numerous times 
in which critics sought to de-authorise Occupy for its performative contradictions. Critics assumed a 
necessary link between who Occupiers were and the role they performed, and therefore continuously 
set the movementÕs claims against OccupiersÕ behaviour (e.g. their critique of capitalism and 
globalisation against their patterns of consumption or models of communication and organisation). 
Without a convincing performance of the vox populi, whereby the audience was persuaded that 
Occupiers looked the part, the movement could easily find itself de-authorised and descend into 
powerlessness. 
 
Critical to the movementÕs success was its ability to speak to the public in ways that attracted their 
attention, and most importantly resonated with it. The beginnings of Occupy were nonetheless marked 
by the indifference of the media and the danger that its representative claim would not even get off the 
ground, because no one would hear it. It took some time before the media acknowledged Occupiers as 
legitimate political protesters and before becoming perhaps the chief disseminator of their claim.  
 
Much of this resistance resulted from the movementÕs refusal to act by the systemÕs rules of 
recognition of something as representation: What was their authority to speak? Who spoke for them? 
Did anyone have a duty to listen if Occupy, like RousseauÕs legislator, eschewed most rules of 
discursive and deliberative engagement? The face Occupy turned to the public was that of a many-
faced protesting crowd, whose primary concern was to shake the public out of its passivity by making 
a radical denunciation, not to cause a favourable impression. This made Occupy especially vulnerable 
to reputation attacks, and gradually shifted in the locus of the political contest from claim to claim-
maker. In the last stages of the New York occupation especially, as the sanitary conditions of the 
encampment hit the headlines, OccupiersÕ struggled with their media depiction as a Òbunch of dirty 
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hippies,Ó who had nothing in common with ordinary hard-working Americans, nothing that could 
make a difference politically. In reaction to the shift of media attention from the movementÕs claim, 
with its normativity founded on justice, to the claim-makers, whose normativity as ÒrespectableÓ 
citizens was being questioned, a group of activists mounted a counter-campaign. They urged 
Occupiers to dress up in suits, and make themselves look like people to listen to.40 Occupiers, they 
claimed half-ironically, needed to look the part if they were to be taken seriously. The a priori laws of 
the distribution of the sensible, conditioning what it is possible to see and listen, to say and think, to 
show and make, were closing down on them. 
 
The episode is no more than a metaphor for the struggles of the movement. In the absence of proper 
authority from the represented, Occupy sought to circumvent this original political incapacity by way 
of a temporary usurpation. They addressed the American public bearing their collective person, and 
borrowed from the principle of popular sovereignty to claim the right to be heard, and re-open to 
question what the people is. This was a daring move, fusing Òtheatrical pose and performative action,Ó 
in the hope that they would not undermine but actually reinforce one another.41 Too much 
theatricality, and their acting might be perceived as pure histrionics. Indeed, Occupy would often 
appear in the media described as ÒcircusÓ and Òstreet theatre,Ó or, on account of its unchoreographed 
Òfree play,Ó as inconsequential play-pretend protest made for the fun of it. If Occupiers wanted to 
offer themselves as a convincing embodiment of the 99 per cent, their performance of the claim could 
not lend itself to its characterisation as pure street performance, to be recognised solely for its 
entertainment value. This was the kind of theatricality the movement needed to battle against, if it 
were to produce a lasting effect. But too little reliance on the powers of theatre, and the movement Ð a 
minoritarian leftist movement without weight or influence across the country Ð would have lacked the 
resources to lay claim to the people, and to confer national visibility to its claim. Acting as if they 
were the sovereign 99 per cent required staging and dramatisation, but an inapt dramaturgy, where 
actor, act, and scene did not align, could alienate the audience, and jeopardise the movementÕs 
chances of energising and mobilising it.  
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Felicitous Claims? 
 
OccupyÕs performativity was self-foundational. It amounted to stepping into the role of the sovereign 
and assuming the mantle of an authority to which the movement had no legitimate a priori claim, in 
the expectation of obtaining it after the fact. As its critics rightly pointed out, Occupy was not a 
movement of the 99 per cent of the American population, not even a movement which could 
realistically expect to be embraced by the 99 per cent: the 99 per cent was rather a projected image of 
unity which, given the diversity of interests comprised, would eventually break down and never 
actualize.  
 
What the critics did not see, however, was that to say this is to fail to understand the nature and 
dynamics of democratic politics. This politics, as Linda Zerilli rightly puts it, consists exactly in 
making claims to community, Òwhich, being claims, are always inevitably partial and exclusive.Ó42 
Hence, to cite exclusion as the basis of oneÕs critique without further specification, is to pose Òthe 
possibility that there could in fact be a claim that does not exclude,Ó43 a dangerous fantasy that 
whenever posed as the principle of oneÕs political action tends to end up generating the most extreme 
exclusion.  
 
This points towards the importance of thinking of political representation not in a pointillistic manner, 
but as as a systemic property of our democracies, whose politics hinges on making, judging, accepting 
or contesting claims to community. Claims that anticipate an agreement, but remain essentially 
contestable. In this system, the people can only be enacted by the retrospective approval or 
disapproval of claims to representation. But this need not, indeed should not, take the plebiscitary 
character of a ÒyeaÓ or Ònay.Ó If it is to be democratic enhancing, each claim to community is to work 
instead as an invitation to collective self-questioning, to the exercise of anotherÕs own power to make 
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his/her judgment about the limits of the claim, and to make alternative claims to community Ð i.e., to 
exercise his/her own power to act politically by associating with others. In other words, claim making 
beyond election is not democratic because it is made in the name of the people, but insofar as it 
exhibits a commitment to the principle of democratic equality, of shared rule between equals, none of 
which has the last word.44 In a democracy no one can, therefore, speak for the people and expect not 
to be challenged, notably by those who are named and affected by his pronouncements and actions, 
which the claim maker must seek not only to include but also to empower by non-electoral means.45 
This was something that Occupy, arguably, sought to do (although its strongly moralising rhetoric, 
suggesting conspiracy and dupery, had strong exclusionary effects, not the least for the 99 per cent, 
whose reflection on the structural reasons behind the divide may thereby be halted). 
 
That our freedom is premised on the fact that in a democracy every claim to representation is already 
a crisis of representation46 is a fact that is often misunderstood and more rarely embraced. Also the 
particular nature of claims to representation goes many times unrecognized. Therefore, many were 
those who failed to recognize the nature of the 99 per cent to which Occupy appealed. This was not an 
existing socio-political empirical entity. It was rather a case of representation as prefiguration, or, to 
paraphrase Jacques Rancire, a form of political subjectification reaching out to a ÒpeopleÓ yet to be, 
but already providing the means of normative critique.  
 
For this critique to have a visible impact, however, Occupy needed to strike a chord with Americans. 
Evidence of the felicity of the movementÕs representative claim was required, if there was to be proof, 
albeit provisional, of its capacity to address the public. This could come in various forms, from the 
movementÕs capacity to attract a following to its capacity to gain public favour. On both counts, there 
were signs of the claim gaining traction.  
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Occupy did attract a following as testified by the progression from the original occupation of Wall 
Street with a couple of thousand activists to the nationwide movement spreading to more than 600 
American cities. But although the number of ordinary Americans tuning in to the protests expanded 
significantly, in face of the expansive nature of the movementÕs claim to community, relatively few 
were actually present.  
 
To get a sense of the movementÕs backing, one needs to turn away from the protesting crowd to 
surveys, but not without acknowledging how distorting this might be on account of surveysÕ attempt 
to treat the Òpublic as social fact independent of any discursive address or circulation.Ó47 Several polls 
released in the autumn/winter of 2011 showed surprising levels of endorsement of the movement 
nationwide. Whilst most Americans seemed to take a neutral stance toward it Ð either for lack of 
information or due to the movementÕs resistance to state its goals Ð the majority of polls showed that 
the number of those supportive of OccupyÕs message outweighed that of its opponents. Even the 
worst polls were still positive, pointing toward an even split between supporters and opponents. These 
were all clear signs of acceptance, or at least non-objection, of the movementÕs representative claim 
by the relevant public, and they lent provisional democratic legitimacy to its ongoing action. As time 
went by, however, OccupyÕs favourable position began to fade.48  
 
Is this to be taken as proof that OccupyÕs message failed to resonate with America? Speaking of 
OccupyÕs message might itself sound questionable given the movementÕs resistance to making itself 
legible by articulating a demand, or a set of demands, that people could get behind and support. But 
for all the lack of demands, Americans seem to have understood that, whatever else Occupy might 
have been about, it was definitely for the denunciation of wronged equality. Occupy pointed a finger 
at the uneven distribution of money and wealth in America and at the control the moneyed interests 
exercised over the political process. Polls showed that the population understood this message, and 
that, by and large, Americans did not object to the presence OccupyÕs representative claim afforded 
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them. Given the amplitude of the constituency Occupy targeted, any serious objection to the claim 
would have to have come in the form of a counter-representation, some individual or group giving 
Americans an alternative presence. But this never happened.  
 
Why the decline in public support then? Did Americans cease to recognise inequality as an issue they 
should attend to? To answer this question one needs to separate the ÒwhatÓ from the ÒwhoÓ of 
representation. For what seems to have happened is that the ambivalence of the public regarding 
Occupy that many polls detected from the beginning became more acute over time. I refer to the 
mixed feelings of the public about Occupiers and the occupation, on the one hand, and on the other 
their endorsement of the movementÕs political message. This cognitive distinction between claim-
makers and representative claim underpinning support for Occupy disappeared as a result of a series 
of events: growing tensions between the movementÕs anarchist base and its allies (e.g., unionists, 
liberals, some Democrats); the movementÕs withdrawal to its more radical base; and, finally, its re-
centring in the occupation. To put it simply, as the movement became the occupation, and the 
occupation became wrapped in controversy, the publicÕs wariness about the protesters grew to such a 
degree that it threatened to drown out the claim. Even in the eyes of many of those who had originally 
seen themselves as implicated in OccupyÕs representative claim, the movement had come to be more 
about Occupy than about the things they really cared about.  
 
But to assess the success of Occupy simply by its capacity to attract a following, gain the favour of 
public opinion, reconfigure the political agenda, shape party electoral platforms and even electoral 
outcomes might be to force upon it the system of rules it rejected. Occupy did not seek state power or 
to change party programmes. It sought to empower the people non-electorally. It sought to make 
separate individuals think themselves into a people by recognizing a wrong that they were represented 
as having in common: i.e., their status as supernumerary and unaccounted for within the existing 
political order. If the people is best understood as such occasional mobilisations,49 hinging on claims 
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to speak in its name, then there will have been a people, even if infelicitous;50 it will not be realized, 
but it will not be nothing either. It may have some lingering effect in the way we see the world and go 
on living a life in our culture that can come to inform later forms of practice. Such can be the 
reverberating power of constituent moments, however conflicted.  
  
Conclusion 
 
OccupyÕs attempt at enacting the unity of people around a particular generality Ð the side of the 
inequality divide they find themselves in Ð is an instantiation of the paradox of democratic origins in 
its iteration through the ongoing attempts at re-foundation that, as Rousseau showed us, mark the lives 
of established democracies. Because they gesture towards an authority they do not legitimately 
possess but which they must assume to be able to take the speaking and acting position of Òthe 
people,Ó self-authorised representatives need to face an ongoing process of legitimation and de-
legitimation, which solicits our judgment, and takes time to settle. Only this judgement can ultimately 
determine whether the representative was a populist impostor, co-opting the people for its own sake, 
or whether its enactment of the people offered a real opportunity for reflexive emancipation. But this 
judgment need not be unguided. Although reality is often more promiscuous than this categories may 
suggest, a guiding criteria is the extent to which he contributed to the understanding of popular 
sovereignty as a dynamic and open-ended process of claims making rather than and fixed and unified 
will of the people as one.  
 
Occupy anticipated and enacted the unity of Americans with a view to triggering revolutionary 
change. Their performative speech, as crystallized in the simplicity of the 99 per cent claim, 
represented an attempt to re-order the world rather than simply representing it as is. This re-ordering 
was to be made in the image of the occupation, itself conceived as a self-conscious revolutionary act, 
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which Occupiers hoped would ignite a much larger all-transforming revolution, at home and abroad, 
by way of a domino effect. Their hopes were doomed to disappointment, and the ÒrevolutionÓ that 
was left was too self-conscious to be real. The movementÕs success in catching the public eye and 
having its representative claim delivered to the targeted national and international audience through 
the media worked against any revolutionary appeal it might have had. A revolution that is constantly 
televised, and whose inconsistencies are dissected in real time and re-run to exhaustion, transforms 
itself into a derivative of reality television, which objectifies everyone in the movement rather than 
putting people Òin the driverÕs seat.Ó51 
 
For all its all its flaws, for all its evanescence, for all its performative contradictions, OccupyÕs most 
lasting legacy might well be its shattering of the myth of America as an opportunity society and its 
broadening of the American language of politics: from the monopoly of the language of interests to a 
language of justice that does not speak from a neutral stance, but rather reinvents political antagonism. 
In so doing, it did not start a revolutionary change, but it did give politicians a clear message as to 
what issues they need to care about if they are to answer their reawakened constituencies. It is, 
therefore, no coincidence that in his Commemorative Martin Luther King Speech, President Obama, 
however strategically, recalled the promise made at the act of founding and deemed it undelivered in 
the rising levels of inequality. The ÒWe, the PeopleÓ that the constitution constructed, and that Luther 
KingÕs civil rights movement reconstructed on behalf of African Americans, was again divided in 
itself. And it took yet another Òinformal and unauthorised claimÓ made in Òthe peopleÕs nameÓ to 
transform this fact into an opportunity for democratic self-constitution.52 
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